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Abstract
Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to
be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full co-
ordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some
measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal
witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordi-
nation can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no
coordination is to be preferred.
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The last few decades have seen growing integration of economic activities of
diﬀerent countries that has facilitated mobility of production factors such
as capital and labor. While economic integration is beneﬁcial in certain
aspects, there has been an increasing concern that it may lead to ﬁscal
competition among governments over mobile tax bases, constraining their
ability to raise revenue for allocative and redistributive purposes. Fiscal
competition results in the tax burden being shifted away from mobile tax
bases into immobile ones and leads to the so-called race to the bottom. Such
an unwanted outcome calls for ﬁscal coordination among governments.1 In
some cases coordination is enough to restore eﬃciency.
However for political reasons it is not always possible to agree on full
tax coordination and one could be forced to resort to partial coordination.
Suppose for example that both capital and unskilled labor are mobile and
t h a tat a xi si m p o s e do nb o t ho ft h e s ef a c t o r sa sw e l la so ns o m ei m m o b i l e
factors. Suppose further that in autarky social optimality implies taxing
capital income and subsidizing income of unskilled labor. In a setting with
a large number of identical countries we have no tax at all and thus no
redistribution. Ideally, one would like to impose the ﬁrst-best tax/subsidy
structure to all countries. But if this is not possible and if the only feasible
policy is to adopt a minimum tax on capital income, should we implement
it? We show in this paper that such a partial coordination policy can only
be socially desirable if the technology is such that the competition for the
mobile factor left alone does not have so perverse eﬀects that national social
welfare decreases.
Paradoxically there has been little work on this issue of partial coordi-
nation. Fuest (1995) analyzes a model where national governments react to
coordinated capital tax increases by providing more public inputs in order
to attract mobile capital and thus reduce the eﬀectiveness of coordination.
Cremer and Gahvari (1996) analyze a model with tax evasion and endoge-
nous tax auditing. They show that governments react to tax coordination
by cutting eﬀective tax rates via reduced auditing. Finally Fuest and Huber
(1999) argue that partial coordination is unlikely to be eﬀective if the inter-
action between diﬀerent parts of the tax system is not taken into account.
The reason is that coordination agreements covering only one tax will induce
governments to adjust their tax policy using the other tax instruments; the
ineﬃciencies associated with tax competition will then persist. Our paper
1For surveys see Wilson (1999), Cremer et al. (1996), Wellich (2000) or Hauﬂer (2001).
1is related to these works, but diﬀer in that we focus on income redistri-
bution and derive a condition for partial ﬁscal coordination to be welfare
worsening/enhancing in an explicit and simple form.
T h ep l a no ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s .I nS e c t i o n2t h eb a s i cm o d e li sp r e -
sented and the closed-economy situation leading to full redistribution of in-
come between workers and rentiers/capitalists is discussed. The next section
analyzes the consequences of integrating small countries whose governments
feel unable to inﬂuence the world prices of the mobile factors through their
ﬁscal policies. In the absence of policy coordination all taxes are set equal
to zero, which means that there is no redistribution at all. In Section 4
containing the main result of the paper, the welfare eﬀect of some partial
coordination of ﬁscal coordination is studied. The last section presents some
concluding remarks.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
We consider an economic union consisting of J identical countries. Within
each country j,as i n g l eo u t p u tYj is produced using three factors: land,
capital and labor. Land is naturally immobile while both capital and la-
bor are perfectly mobile. The technology is represented by a concave CRS
production function:
Yj = G(Kj,L j,T j)
where Kj is capital, Lj labor and Tj land, all three used in country j.S i n c e
Tj is exogenously given and identical across countries, one can also write
this production function as:
Yj = F (Kj,L j) (1)
where the rent from land use, πj,i s :
πj = Yj − Kj F
j
K − Lj F
j
L . (2)
We assume that there are two types of individuals: the rentiers/capital
owners the number of which is normalized to 1 and the Lj workers whose
labor supply is also normalized to 1.
Each national government levies taxes on the three factors used within
the borders of its country (source-based taxes). The only purpose of taxation
here is redistributive. Therefore the budget constraint in country j is:
τK
j Kj + τL
j Lj + τT
j =0 (3)
2where the τ’s denote the per-unit taxes and where the land in each country
(Tj)i sn o r m a l i s e dt o1.
In a closed economy (autarky), each national government is assumed to
maximize a utilitarian welfare function subject to the budget constraint just
introduced:
SWj = u(Rj)+Lj u(Ωj)
where Rj denotes the rentier/capitalist’s net income and Ωj aw o r k e r ’ sn e t
wage. With competitive factor markets, these are given by:




















(we use (3) to obtain the second expression of Rj). It is quite obvious that
in the closed economy setting, the only relevant tax is τL
j .O n eo ft h et w o
other taxes is redundant (and can so be chosen arbitrarily)










In this very simple setting, output is fully determined by the ﬁxed inputs
and is divided in 1+Lj equal shares. We now consider what happens when
both K and L are allowed to move.
3 Factor mobility and the race to the bottom










j = ω, j =1 ,...,J.
where   and ω denote the net interest rate and net wage respectively in the
world markets. This implies the following factor demands:
Kj = Kj
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We will distinguish in each country the initial endowments of factors,
denoted by ¯ K and ¯ L, that are the same across countries and the actual
levels of factors used, denoted by Kj and Lj. At the equilibrium of the


















= J ¯ L. (5.2)























=0 , which implies
that with J large enough, ω and   are taken as given by each country. This
is the assumption adopted in this paper: each country is small relative to
the whole world.
When there is no government intervention, the market solution is the
same in autarky and in an open economy:
Ωj = ω = FL





¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
− ¯ Lω . (7)
We assume that Rj >ωin this laissez-faire situation.
We now turn to the implication of factor mobility on the redistributive
tax policy. Each national government maximizes:
SWj = u(Rj)+¯ Lu(ω).
We thus assume that each national government is concerned by the welfare of
its natives3 and not by that of its actual labor force. It maximizes SWj with
2To show this, let us ﬁrst totally diﬀerentiate the optimality conditions of the pro-
ductive sector, i.e. F
j
K(Kj,L j)=rj(≡   + τ
K
j ) and F
j




































j ,w et h e nd i ﬀerentiate (4.1) and (4.2) with respect to  ,ω and τ
K

























j .S o l v i n g
this system of two equations yields d /dτ
K
j = −1/J and dω/dτ
K
j =0at the symmetric





j = −1/J, are obtained in the same way.
3This assumption is made for the sake of simplicity.
4respect to both taxes τK
j and τL
j for given values   and ω (the tax on land
τT
j is actually a lump-sum tax. It can be set at any level, e.g. 100%, without
loss of generality). Therefore, from each country’s perspective maximizing
SWj amounts to maximizing Rj:
Rj = Fj −  Kj − ωL j +   ¯ K = F
j
T + τK
j Kj + τL
j Lj +   ¯ K. (8)






























Since   and ω are taken as given the eﬀect of a change in τK
j on either
Kj or Lj i st h es a m ea st h ee ﬀect of a change in rj ≡   + τK
j and the same
holds for τL
j with wj ≡ ω + τL



















































¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
S
where S = FKK(K,L)FLL(K,L) − F2
KL(K,L) > 0. Note for further ref-
erence that at the symmetric equilibrium the derivatives of the demand
functions for Kj and Lj in (9.1) and (9.2) are identical across countries and
only depend upon K and L.
It is clear from (10) that τK
j = τL
j =0 . I nt h es m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y
setting adopted here where the world prices of mobile factors are taken as
given by each country, redistributive taxes are equal to zero. This is the
canonical illustration of the so-called race to the bottom.
This solution is to be contrasted with that obtained in autarky and
given in (4). It is also to be compared with that obtained in a cooperative
framework wherein a supranational government would maximize the sum
of all national social welfares. In our current setting of identical countries,
5the cooperative solution would be the same as (4),t h a ti si tw o u l di m p l y
equal disposable income for the two types of individuals within and across
countries.
Such a global optimum could be decentralized by letting the market
forces operate but with a uniform subsidy
¡
−τL¢




that would be set so as to equate the disposable
incomes.
For a number of reasons pertaining mainly to political economy, it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd an agreement on such taxes. At best, one can expect that
there will be an agreement around what is the most shocking consequence
of tax competition, the fact that some “symbolic" sources of income, typi-
cally capital, fully escape taxation. What we now show is that reaching an
agreement on a certain level of taxation of capital can be, in some instance,
welfare worsening.
4 Partial tax coordination
Starting from the laissez-faire s i t u a t i o nw et h u sn o wt u r nt ot h ec a s ew h e r e
only some partial coordination is possible. We consider the case where in
ac o o r d i n a t e dm o v eτK
j is increased to what we call a minimum rate while
the other tax τL
j is free to vary the way the countries decide. Let τK be this
minimum rate that all countries are forced to apply. This means that we














0 does not hold anymore. To see the eﬀect on τL
j of a small coordinated
increase in τK,w ed i ﬀerentiate (11) with respect to the tax rates:
Kj















¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
FKK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢ (12)
since the new Nash equilibrium remains symmetric with the initial endow-
ments of capital and labor equally shared across countries. Individual coun-
tries react to the positive capital tax rate in the same way which implies
that no country succeeds in attracting more capital or labor although each
aims to do so in choosing its own tax rate on labor.
6Starting from disposable income b Ωj = ω for the workers and b Rj =
F
¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
− ¯ Lω for the rentier/capital owner in each country at the laissez-
faire, we now look for the impact of an increase in τK on these incomes at the
symmetric equilibrium: Ωj = b Ωj−τ
j
L and Rj = b Rj−τT
j −τK ¯ K = b Rj+τL
j ¯ L
(from (6) and (7)):
d Ωj
dτ K = −
dτ L
j
dτ K = −
FKL
¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
FKK




dτ K = ¯ L
dτ L
j
dτ K = ¯ L
FKL
¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢
FKK
¡ ¯ K, ¯ L
¢.
Introducing these relations in the expression for social welfare improvement,
we have in each country:
dS W j
dτ K = ¯ Lu 0 (Ωj)
d Ωj
dτ K + u0 (Rj)
dR j
dτ K
= ¯ L [u0 (Rj) − u0 (Ωj)]
FKL( ¯ K,¯ L)
FKK( ¯ K,¯ L).









. When moving away from that situation by increasing
marginally τK in a coordinated way (dτK > 0) we conclude that
dS W j ≶ 0,d Ωj ≶ 0 and dR j ≷ 0 if FKL(K,L) ≶ 0.
In other words, if FKL(K,L) < 0, namely if the two mobile factors are
substitutes, then implementing a minimum tax on capital income is welfare
worsening.
The intuition for this apparently paradoxical result is the following.
From (12) we know that when FLK(K,L) < 0,
dτ L
j
dτ K > 0. Basically, each
country reacts to the now positive source-based tax on capital by levying a
positive tax on the labor used within its boundaries since its capital tax base
so increases. So doing each country takes   and ω as given and thus its only
purpose is to maximize the income of its rentier/capital owner. However  
and ω are actually aﬀected because all countries behave in the same way,
which explains why SWj decreases. Naturally with a diﬀerent technology
such that FLK(K,L) > 0, increasing τK would be welfare enhancing.
75C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have considered a very simple economy consisting of iden-
tical small open economies with two mobile factors (capital and labor) to
illustrate the idea that partial coordination can be socially undesirable. In
our setting we show that when factors are mobile the global optimum can be
achieved by imposing a tax on capital and a subsidy on labor (with the tax
on rentiers/capital owners resulting from the budget constraint). If how-
ever only one of these two taxes can be subjected to a coordinated policy,
adopting a minimum tax for capital income can be welfare worsening when
capital and labour are substitutes.
The framework adopted in this paper is admittedly restrictive: small
open identical countries;two types of individuals: workers and rentiers/capital
owners. A more general framework could be adopted allowing for strategic
behavior by countries or for more realistic social groups (skilled and un-
skilled workers, each holding a share of the capital stock and of the national
ﬁrms). The same conclusion can be shown to hold.4
4See Marchand et al. (2002). In this paper we consider the case of strategic interaction
with a small number of countries J; we also look at the non symmetrical case.
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